

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06830 01 OF 02 162150Z

66

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 063936

R 161639Z MAY 75 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 288

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 6830

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VIENNA MEETING WITH GROMYKO

REF A. MOSCOW 6828 B. MOSCOW 6669 C. MOSCOW 6673

D. MOSCOW 6670.

1. SINCE YOUR LAST MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN FEBRUARY, SOVIET POLICIES IN THE WORLD HAVE PROSPERED. THE EVENTS IN INDOCHINA HAVE GIVEN THE SOVIETS THEIR GREATEST OPPORUTNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA EVER (REF A); PORTUGAL HAS MOVED LEFTWARD; AND U.S. EFFORTS AT FURTHER ARAB-ISRAELI PROGRESS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED. FOR ALL OF THIS, MOSCOW, NOT BEING THE ROOT CAUSE OF ANY OF THESE EVENTS, HAS SO FAR AVOIDED PAYING A PRICE IN ITS DETENTE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. MOREOVER, WITH THE OUSTER OF SHELEPIN, BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL POSITON HAS BEEN STRENGHTENED. (REF B). THESE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUED TO THE NEW NOTE OF CONFIDENCE OBVIOUS IN SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THEY HAVE STRENGTHENED MOSCOW'S CONVICTION THAT IT IS ON THE RIGHT FOREIGN POLICY COURSE (ARBATOV, WE UNDERSTAND, IN A PRIVATE TALKS WITH HIS STAFF, CALLED THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM ONE OF THE "FRUITS" OF DETENTE). AND THEY HAVE PROBABLY MADE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MORE ABLE TO ABSORB SETBACKS TO THEIR POLICY (LIKE MFN).

2. THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP UNDOUBTEDLY SEES NO REASON TO CHANGE A POLICY THAT IS WORKING SO WELL. SINCE THEY THINK THE COURSE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06830 01 OF 02 162150Z

EVENTS IS GOING TO THEIR DIRECTION ANYWAY, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE

FAIRLY PRUDENT IN AREAS (E.G., KOREA OR PORTUGAL) WHERE A FORWARD SOVIET POSITION COULD PROVOKE A U.S. OR WESTERN REACTION. THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE DRAWN FROM VIETNAM THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. IS A PAPER TIGER. AS INHERENTLY CAUTIOUS MEN, THEY HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESPECT U.S. RESOLVE AND RESILIENCY, AND THEY HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED THAT CONGRESSIONAL DOVISHNESS OVER INDOCHINA HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO A DESIRE TO DISMANTLE EITHER OUR ALLIANCE SYSTEM OR THE PENTAGON. OUR SALUTARY AND DECISIVE ACTION IN THE WATERS OFF CAMBODIA WILL HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THIS REGARD. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS MAY BE INCLINED TO EXPECT, NOT A WEAKENING, BUT A HARDENING, WITH CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, OF THE U.S. POSITION ON SECURITY MATTERS. THIS MAY HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR GROMYKO'S WASPISH OUTBURST--UNUSUAL, EVEN FOR HIM--OVER YOUR ST. LOUIS SPEECH.

3. WHILE OBVIOUSLY NOT UNHAPPY OVER THE FOREIGN POLICY BLOWS THE U.S. HAS ABSORBED, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY DO SEE SOME DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THEM. THEY DO NOT WANT US TO SLIP INTO AN ISOLATIONIST FORTRESS-AMERICA MENTALITY WHICH INTER ALIA COULD COST THEM A STILL-PROMISING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH US, COULD IMPERIL CHANCES FOR SALT, COULD LEAD TO A MILITARY RESURGENCE IN WEST GERMANY, AND COULD DESTABILIZE ASIA TO CHINESE ADVANTAGE. THEY SEE A STAKE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE AVOIDANCE OF A SPASMODIC REVERSAL OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM, AND THIS IS AN IMPORTANT REASON WHY THEY DO NOT FULLY REGARD OUR SETBACKS AS ADVANCES. THIS, HOWEVER, WILL NOT DETER GROMYKO FROM TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AT VIENNA. HE WILL CERTAINLY TRY TO PICTURE THE SOVIET UNION AS THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE LACK OF RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE AND A CSCE SUMMIT. HIS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF YOU IS A WARNING THAT HE IS READY FOR A TOUGH SESSION. I THINK YOU WILL LOSE NOTHING BY BEING JUST AS TOUGH IN RETURN; THE BALANCE YOU STRUCK IN YOUR ST. LOUIS SPEECH, WHATEVER GROMYKO MAY THINK OF IT, SEEMED TO ME JUST RIGHT.

4. ALONG THOSE LINES, IT WOULD BE WELL TO REMIND GROMYKO THAT--WHATEVER THE SOVIET ROLE, OR LACK OF IT, IN PROVOKING DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ASIA--THE UNITED STATES WILL BE CAREFULLY WATCHING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE USSR SEEKS TO USE DETENTE TO EXPLOIT NEW SITUATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, THREE POINTS COULD BE MADE. FIRST, THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT BREZHNEV'S IMPLICATION THAT THE NORTH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 06830 01 OF 02 162150Z

VIETNAMESE TAKEOVER OF THE SOUTH IS AN ASPECT OF, OR A BENEFIT TO, DETENTE. SECOND, THAT THE INDOCHINA DENOUEMENT SHOULD NOT DELUDE ANYBODY INTO THINKING THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT HONOR ITS TREATY COMMITMENTS IN ASIA OR ELSEWHERE, AND THIS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES KOREA. (WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON KIM IL SUNG (REF C) AND WOULD PLAY FIRM U.S. LANGUAGE BACK TO HIM IF THEY GET THE CHANCE). AND THIRD, THAT THE VOTE IN PORTUGAL SHOWS CLEARLY WHERE THE POPULAR WILL LIES,

AND ANY EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN WITH SOVIET SUPPORT TO DENY THAT WILL CAN ONLY HAVE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON DETNETE IN GENERAL AND CSCE IN PARTICULAR.

5. ALL THEIR SUCCESSES NOTWITHSTANDING, THE SOVIET PATH TO THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS NEXT FEBRUARY IS NOT WITHOUT PERIL. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS CONSISTANTLY IN NEED OF NEW MOMENTUM, AND THE TIMETABLE IS LAGGING ON THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE (MEPC), ON CSCE, AND ON THE SOVIET-INITIATED CONFERENCE OF EUPOPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. WHILE THE DELAY IN CSCE AND THE BERLIN COMMUNIST MEETING IS LARGELY DUE TO SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE AND IS THUS REVERSIBLE THROUGH TACTICAL CONCESSIONS BY MOSCOW, THE MEPC IS MUCH LESS IN SOVIET GRASP.

6. IN THE MORE SOBER ATMOSPHERE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE COMING WASHINGTON SUMMIT IS LESS NECESSARY TO BOTH SIDES THAN ANY OF THE FIRST FOUR MEETINGS. BUT PROBABLY THE SOVIETS NEED IT MORE THAN WE DO. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OBLIQUELY BY THE MFA THAT GROMYKO WILL WANT TO TIE DOWN A SUMMIT DATE AT VIENNA. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND YOU HAVE LINKED THE SUMMIT TO A SALT AGREEMENT; I BELEIVE THAT YOU SHOULD STICK STRONGLY TO THIS POSITION IN VIENNA.

7. DESPITE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES, THE U.S. IS THEREFORE NOT WITHOUT LEVERAGE ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO MOSCOW. THIS IS, OF COURSE, PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE CENTRAL DISCUSSION TOPICS AT VIENNA: THE MIDDLE EAST AND CSCE.

8. WITH REGARD TO CSCE, GROMKYO'S EYES WILL BE FIRMLY FOCUSED ON THE NATO SUMMIT TWO WEEKS HENCE. HE WILL WANT THE U.S. TO GO TO BRUSSELS WITH THE MESSAGE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY TAKEN A REASONABLE POSITION ON THE REMAINING ISSUES AND TO URGE ITS ALLIES TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE ON A JULY SUMMIT. TO THIS END, I
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 06830 01 OF 02 162150Z

EXPECT HIM TO TRY A MIXTURE OF CAJOLERY AND MODERATION ON YOU-- A DIFFICULT COMBINATION FOR GROMYKO. HE IS LIKLEY TO BLAME THE U.S. FOR NOT EXERTING ENOUGH EFFORT TO BRING ITS ALLIES AROUND. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WILL GIVE THE MOST REASONABLE POSSIBLE PICTURE OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON CBM'S, JOURNALISTS, TRAVEL, FOLLOW-UP, AND OTHER ITEMS, AND MAY WELL OFFER ADDITIIONAL CONCESSIONS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY FIGURE THAT--IF THE BRUSSELS MEETING TAKES A POSITIVE POSITION ON A SUMMIT--THE LANDSLIDE TOWARD HELSINKI WILL HAVE BEGUN AND EVEN SOVIET RENEGING ON PRIOR VERBAL ASSURANCES WILL NOT STOP IT. I SUGGEST THAT, WITHOUT SOUNDING NEGATIVE, YOU LEAVE THE THOUGHT WITH GROMYKO THAT IT IS NOT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS, BUT SOVIET MOVEMENT IN GENEVA, THAT WILL DETERMINE THE LEVEL AND TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06830 02 OF 02 162202Z

66

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 064412

R 161639Z MAY 75 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 289

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 6830

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

9. FINALLY, ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR VIEWS ON WHERE THE RECENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ROUND HAS LED ARE GIVEN IN REF D. THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEY HAVE SHOWN MODERATION IN TOLERATING THE U.S. EFFORT TO ARRANGE ANOTHER DISENGAGEMENT AND IN TRYING TO GET A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE FROM THE ARABS AFTER IT FAILED. THEY HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN MAKING THE MEPC SHOW PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, SINCE GENEVA IS THE BEST VEHICLE FOR ENSURING THEIR ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, THEIR SUSPICIONS ABOUT OUR MOTIVES HAVE GROWN. WHILE GROMYKO'S APRIL 23 AND MAY 14 ATTACKS ON THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WERE LARGELY TACTICAL, THEY ALSO REFLECT A GROWING SOVIET FEAR THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO CUT THEM OUT PERMANENTLY. GROMYKO WILL THEREFORE PROBABLY SEEK A FIRM ASSURANCE FROM YOU THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCES SHOULD BE THE LOCUS OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

10. IN OUR VIEW, THE TIME HAS COME TO PROVIDE THE ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. IS NOW WILLING TO GIVE GENEVA A TRY AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN DEALING WITH THE MAJOR PROBLEMS STILL COMPLICATING THE REOPENING OF THE MEPC. THE PRICE WE PAY FOR THIS IS CONCEDED TO THE SOVIETS, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, AN INSTITUTIONALIZED ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I DO NOT THINK THIS IS TOO HIGH A PRICE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE POINT HAS BEEN REACHED WHERE IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP THEM OUT ANYWAY. BRINGING THEM IN WILLINGLY, ON THE OTHER HAND, COULD WELL EXERT A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THEIR INCLINATION TO MAKE TROUBLE, AND IT WOULD MAXIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF POSITIVE SOVIET HELP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06830 02 OF 02 162202Z

ON DIFFICULT ISSUES. THE NEGATIVE REASONS ARE PERHAPS EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS A SOLID REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. SEEKS TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE AREA COULD PROVOKE A MAJOR REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. WHILE ADMITTEDLY THE SOVIETS DO NOT HOLD MANY HIGH CARDS IN THIS AREA, SUCH A REASSESSMENT COULD RESULT IN A SOVIET DRIVE TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE RADICAL ARABS AND TO DISRUPT ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE ARGUMENT IN THE KREMLIN MIGHT RUN THAT, IF THE U.S. IS NOT WILLING TO LET THE USSR PLAY A ROLE--EVEN A RESPONSIBLE ROLE--AS A GREAT POWER, THEN WHY NOT USE SOVIET STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE ABILITY TO PLAY A SPOILING GAME TO FORCE AN ACCEPTANCE OF THAT ROLE? IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE COULD NOT EVEN BE SURE THAT SOVIET RELUCTANCE FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. WOULD EXERT AS RESTRAINING AN INFLUENCE AS IT HAS IN THE PAST.

11. BY AGREEING TO GET GENEVA GOING, WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BLINK AWAY THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE COMPLICATED ITS TIMING AND MANAGEMENT. NOR WOULD OUR ACQUIESCENCE NEED TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SLIP THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES; ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD PERMIT US TO INSIST THAT THEY ACT RESPONSIBLY AND WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO CALL THEM TO ACCOUNT IF THEY DO NOT. HAVING TAKEN A FORTHCOMING APPROACH ON THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL, WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSERT THAT THE USSR MUST NOW COME FORWARD WITH A SCENARIO THAT WILL ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO AVOID AN EARLY FAILURE. AND WE COULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF BEING MANEUVERED INTO A POSITION IN WHICH WE BECOME THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE ISRAELIS AND THE SOVIETS FOR THE ARABS. IN SUM, A POSITIVE U.S. APPROACH MAY WELL OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING PROGRESS WITHIN A GENEVA FORUM AND-- IF ALTERNATIVE AVENUES STILL LOOK MORE PROMISING--OF GETTING THE SOVIETS TO ACQUIESCE IN THEM UNDER SOME KIND OF GENEVA UMBRELLA. STOESEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, CAT-C, PEACE TALKS, CHEROKEE 05/16/75
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW06830
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: I
Film Number: n/a
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750545/aaaaboly.tel
Line Count: 260
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 75 MOSCOW 6828, 75 MOSCOW 6669, 75 MOSCOW 6673, 75 MOSCOW 6670
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <07 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SEC'S VIENNA MEETING WITH GROMYKO
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, GENEVA
To: SS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006